The current economic crisis has triggered fierce debates among policy-makers and the media across and within European countries about the need for a closer European Fiscal Union. Using a novel dataset derived from the Eurobarometer surveys, this article investigates European citizens' opinions towards such fiscal integration. We find that both country-level variables (such as expected country-level costs/benefits) and individual-level variables (such as distrust towards EU institutions, ideology and altruism) have significant explanatory power. We also uncover a notable intra-generational divide across young citizens of Euro creditor and Euro debtor countries, and show that this reflects their varying expectations regarding the future costs and benefits of fiscal integration. This demonstrates that the same demographic groups in different countries may have widely varying positions towards fiscal integration.
INTRODUCTION
Following the 'widening' of the European Union (EU) via several accession waves, recent discussions about the European integration project revolve more around a 'deepening' of the Union (Hobolt, 2014) . This is not only seen in advances of the EU into foreign policy with the establishment of the European External Action Service (Murdoch, 2012; Juncos and Pomorska, 2013; Murdoch and Geys, 2014) , but also in proposals towards "substantially reinforced fiscal surveillance and policy coordination" (European Commission, 2011a, p. 4, italics added) . Two recent examples in this direction include the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance -in force since 1 January 2013 and colloquially known as the 'Fiscal Compact' (European Council, 2012 ) -and the so-called EU economic governance 'Sixpack' -which entered into force on 13 December 2011 (European Commission, 2011b) .
While a progressive deepening of European fiscal integration thus appears to be taking place, little is known about (the determinants of) European citizens' opinions towards such fiscal integration. Nonetheless, elite and public opinions towards European integration need not overlap (Hooghe, 2003) . Moreover, Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) recently illustrated that (the determinants of) support for the EU in general may substantially differ from (the determinants of) support for specific policy transfers to the European level. Since broad-based public support is essential to legitimize the process of integration across EU Member States, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the driving forces behind public opinion towards European fiscal integration. This intends to add to our knowledge of public opinion towards the EU in a setting where EU policy-making moves into what is arguably a core competence of the nation state (i.e. national budgetary policies).
Our empirical analysis predominantly relies on the September 2011 Eurobarometer survey (N=26,856 individuals). This wave is unique in including a series of questions about i) closer fiscal integration (i.e. national budget consultations at EU level and automatic penalties for failing the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact), ii) financial help to Member States in economic crisis (which reflects one instance of joint European-level public expenditures), and iii) the introduction of Eurobonds (which imply joint EU-level guarantees; European Commission, 2011a). Our analysis highlights two central results. First, individual-level variables -such as individuals' altruism, political ideology and distrust towards EU institutions -shape opinions about European fiscal integration alongside country-level variables such as the expected costs/benefits for one's country. This suggests that discussions based on countrylevel costs/benefits may not sufficiently account for deeply divided public opinion on fiscal integration within EU countries (for related findings, see Bechtel et al., 2014; Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014; Tosun et al., 2014) .
Second, we find that young residents of Euro debtor countries (i.e. GIIPS: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) are generally less supportive of fiscal integration than older generations, whereas the opposite tendency arises in Euro creditor countries. Further analysis shows that this intra-generational divide reflects varying expectations regarding the costs and benefits of fiscal integration across European regions. This not only demonstrates that the same demographic groups may have varying positions towards fiscal integration in different countries, but also that younger generations in Euro debtor countries are becoming more sceptical towards the EU project. As such countries have traditionally been pro-EU, this may have important implications for the future course of European integration.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
From a theoretical perspective, we build on the vast foregoing literature examining individuals' opinions towards the EU. Some authors have thereby relied on a utilitarian perspective to argue that citizens' perceptions towards European integration are shaped by the expected costs and benefits from this process (Hobolt, 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014) . Other studies rather focus on the effect of individual-level attitudes (such as their social identification; e.g. Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2004; Chacha, 2013) or, based on the idea that many citizens simply follow the guidance of their party of reference, individuals' political partisanship and ideology (Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Stoeckel, 2013) . We borrow insights from this literature to derive testable hypotheses with respect to European citizens' opinions towards European fiscal integration.
Utility-based theories consider citizens' preferences as being shaped by the expected costs/benefits of public policies. It thus predicts that (groups of) individuals adversely affected by a specific policy will disapprove of it, and vice versa (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005) . In our setting, it is important to observe that all steps taken (or proposed) towards deeper European fiscal integration aim directly or indirectly at addressing the instability of European financial markets. The introduction of Eurobonds (European Commission, 2011a), for instance, would have a more direct effect than the Fiscal Compact (European Commission 2011b), which foremost aims to foster budgetary discipline through stricter fiscal coordination. These measures would thus immediately affect owners of financial assets, since it buttresses the security of their investments. This is likely to induce support for the introduction of Eurobonds and stricter EU-level fiscal coordination. As owners of financial assets are likely to be wealthier, high-income individuals, a slight generalisation of this argument suggests that individuals with high income levels would likewise be more supportive of European fiscal integration. Bechtel et al. (2014) found mixed evidence for such hypothesis regarding German citizens' opinions towards intra-European financial bailouts. This may, however, derive from the narrow and specific nature of their sample (i.e., a country that is one of the largest net-contributors to the EU budget). We evaluate both hypotheses on a broader dataset covering all EU Member States.
H1a. Owners of financial assets are more in favour of European fiscal integration.

H1b. High-income individuals are more in favour of European fiscal integration.
A reinforced fiscal union is likely to affect different Member States to varying degrees because they face different macroeconomic scenarios. From a utilitarian perspective, it is intuitive that policy-makers in high-interest countries will be more likely to approve Eurobonds as this will create an immediate decrease of their borrowing costs. The reverse expectation holds for countries that already pay low interest rates.
1 Consequently, though at the risk of some simplification, we might picture policy-makers' likelihood to approve a deepening European fiscal union as dependent upon their country's public finances. Whether citizens share the views of their policy-makers remains an empirical question. Clearly, however, since such expectations do not concern individuals as components of a specific socio-economic category, but rather as citizens of a specific country, this would be structured as a country-level hypothesis.
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H2. Citizens of Euro debtor countries and countries more affected by the crisis are more in favour of European fiscal integration.
Similarly, various studies have highlighted the role of a country's welfare-state typology in shaping EU support (e.g. Ray, 2004) . The underlying idea is that further European integration may be alarming to countries with more advanced welfare systems, since citizens of such countries fear a dilution of their welfare entitlements through a process of 'mean-reversion'. for instance, widely accepted that if citizens perceive an institution as corrupt, they will trust it less -or not at all. In line with this view, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) shows that citizens are less reluctant to delegate more power to the EU if they trust it -and its institutions -relatively more than their national institutions. This directly leads to the prediction that perceptions of EU institutions likewise shape European fiscal integration approval across European citizens. If citizens consider EU institutions as corrupted, they will be less likely to endorse a further delegation of power to a European authority.
H4. Corruption perceptions of EU institutions discourage support for European fiscal integration.
Moreover, there is a large literature linking political ideology to individuals' policy preferences.
The traditional view here is that left-leaning parties (and partisans) are relatively less in favour of European integration as this process involves some degree of market liberalization (Budge et al., 1987) . In our specific setting, the left may also oppose increased fiscal integration because it threatens domestic welfare programs -and left-leaning parties tend to be more in favour of an equitable (inter)national redistribution of welfare (see also Quinn and Toyoda, 2007; Bechtel et al., 2014) . However, right-leaning parties might similarly oppose closer EUlevel fiscal coordination because of their inherently more nationalist orientation. Furthermore, since closer EU-level fiscal coordination implies a clear case of government intervention, rightwing parties -being generally more in favour of market liberalization (Budge et al., 1987) - are less likely to support it. Overall, therefore, it may well be those in the ideological centre that are most supportive of further European fiscal integration.
H5. Political identification has a non-linear relation to support for European fiscal integration.
Preference heterogeneity within socio-demographic groups
The theoretical discussion thus far follows previous scholarship by implicitly assuming that, regardless of their country of residence, similar citizens have similar preferences towards EU integration. However, this assumption may be overly restrictive. One reason why the same socio-demographic groups across countries might feel differently about European fiscal integration is that the cost and benefits of the current economic crisis -and thereby also of measures leading to a closer fiscal union -are distributed differently depending on the country of residence. Figure 1 illustrates this point. It represents the share of respondents in Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries agreeing that a certain social category has been most severely affected by the current financial crisis in their own country (data taken from Eurobarometer 76.2). Although these perceptions look similar for most groups, there are also clear exceptions:
i.e. unemployed and young adults are perceived as more strongly affected by respondents in Euro debtor countries, whereas single parents (and, to a lesser extent, children) are perceived as more affected by respondents in Euro creditor countries.
Figure 1 about here
To the extent that such perceptions reflect real differences in the distribution of the burden of the crisis across socio-demographic groups in different EU countries, Figure 1 implies that the same socio-demographic groups may have varying evaluations of EU fiscal integration measures across countries. Particularly, Figure 1 suggests that young residents in Euro debtor countries will be more sensitive to EU-imposed fiscal austerity measures compared to young residents in Euro creditor countries. Assuming that older generations do not view a European fiscal union differently across countries 3 , this leads to the proposition that young people in
Euro debtor countries will be relatively less in favour of further fiscal integration relative to those in Euro creditor countries. For the same reason, a similar proposition would arise for the unemployed across both sets of countries, while the reverse would be expected for single parents.
H6. Young and unemployed individuals as well as single parents differ significantly in their opinion towards EU fiscal integration across Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries.
DATA Dependent Variables
The Eurobarometer surveys document the evolution of public opinion across EU Member
States on a regular basis. Its September 2011 wave is of particular relevance to our analysis. It was presented to 26,856 respondents aged 15 and older between 3 and 18 September 2011, and allows us to define a set of four dependent variables to empirically investigate the hypotheses derived above.
Our first dependent variable measures individuals' opinions concerning Eurobonds. This exploits the fact that the introduction of Eurobonds was to be linked to tighter fiscal surveillance of, and policy coordination across, Member States (European Commission, 2011a).
In such framework, Eurobonds effectively become an instrument of European fiscal integration.
We operationalize this first dependent variable based on the following question: 
4-Would benefit only those Member States which are in the worst difficulties.
Since these four statements tap into different, though closely related, aspects of the Eurobonds debate, we generate a composite measure that catches a respondent's overall approval of Eurobonds by adding that person's responses to questions 1 and 2 to the inverse of his/her responses to questions 3 and 4 (since questions 1 and 2 reflect a positive position, while questions 3 and 4 reflect a negative position). The resulting variable ranges from a lowest value of 4 (reflecting total disapproval) to a highest value of 16 (indicating total approval). To evaluate the robustness of our results to this specific operationalisation, we also created two separate measures including, respectively, only the positive items related to financial stability (i.e. items 1 and 2) and the negative items related to the targeted nature of Eurobonds' benefits/costs (items 3 and 4). This alternative operationalisation indicates that our main results arise equally for both sub-scales, though they are qualitatively and quantitatively somewhat stronger for the 'positive' scale (details upon request). In all cases, respondents were asked to provide their opinion on 4-point scale from "Totally
Opposed" (1) to "Totally in Favour" (4), which is the scale employed in the analysis below.
Before turning to the empirical model, it is important to point out that the question wording in all cases tends to be fairly complex. In combination with the absence of a middle category in the answers options, this may lead to the measurement of non-attitudes: i.e. respondents without knowledge of, or opinions on, the topic(s) at hand feeling forced by the survey format to give an answer that suggests the presence of a specific viewpoint. 4 To evaluate whether our inferences are affected by these limitations in the survey design, we looked into two additional 
Methodology and empirical model
Our analysis builds on a multilevel empirical approach. This has two justifications. First, our data are hierarchically organized in two levels -i.e. individuals (level 1) in countries (level 2).
Second, our hypotheses concern effects that play out at both the individual-and country-level, requiring us to explicitly model the variation at both levels (Snijders and Bosker, 1999) . The specification of the individual-level equation is:
Where Yij is the set of dependent variables discussed above for individual i in country j. Note that the intercept (β0j) has a subscript j, indicating that each country has its own intercept that we model in more detail below. To assess hypotheses H1a,b, we include two measures evaluating the importance of individual-level utilitarian means-end reasoning: i.e. INCij is a self-placement item where individuals rank themselves on a ten-point scale from the top to the bottom decile in the country's income distribution, while ASSETSij is an indicator variable equal to 1 for respondents owning bonds or shares. We expect β1>0 and β2>0. Then, we add a variables tapping into respondents' trust in the EU institutions. EU CORRUPTij equals 1 for those disagreeing to the following statement: "There is corruption within the institutions of the EU". As corruption perceptions will undermine trust in the EU, and thereby support for European fiscal integration (see H4), we expect β3>0. Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to include direct measures of individuals' national and/or European identification (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2004; Chacha, 2013; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014) . Still, in a series of auxiliary regressions, we experimented with a proxy set equal to 1 if a respondent feels his/her country is not corrupt while the EU is and -1 when a respondent feels his/her country is corrupt while the EU is not (0 otherwise). This proxy is based on the idea that people identifying with a certain social group tend to display more positive dispositions towards this group compared to an out-group (i.e. in-group/out-group opposition known from social identity theory and social categorization theory; Turner, 1975; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) . Given the indirect nature of this variable and the fact that its inclusion leaves all main effects unaffected, we do not include it in our analysis below (details available upon request) and refer the interested reader to recent studies by Chacha (2013) and Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) for a more in-depth treatment of the potential role of (supra)national identification. 
RESULTS
Baseline estimation results
We use Stata13 to estimate our multilevel model with the maximum-likelihood method. The main results are reported in Table 1 , where each column focuses on one of our four central dependent variables. The final two columns use the alternative measure of Eurobond approval presented above, and are constrained to subsamples of respondents with (Column (5)) and without (Column (6)) detailed knowledge of Eurobonds. As mentioned, this is critical to assess any bias in our findings due to non-attitude measurement. It is also important to note that we estimate a linear multilevel model in column (1), whereas columns (2) to (6) present results from multilevel ordered logit models to accommodate the four-category answer scales for the remaining dependent variables.
Table 1 about here
Looking first at the variables addressing the self-interest hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H2 and H3), we find some evidence for the proposition that owners of financial assets (H1a) and individuals with higher incomes (H1b) are more likely to support European fiscal integration (H1a).
Specifically, they are more supportive of financial help to other Member States during financial crises and of the authority transfers linked to fiscal coordination within the EU (as reflected in EU-level consultation on national budgets and automatic penalties for breaching European debt and deficit regulations). This is at odds with Kuhn and Stoeckel's (2014) finding that individual-level cost-benefit calculations do not affect preferences towards European economic governance. One potential explanation might be that 'economic governance' suggests active EU-level involvement, whereas our measures of fiscal authority transfers imply some degree of automaticity (e.g., 'automatic penalties'). The latter might thus be perceived as less influenced by (short-term) political motives, which is likely to be beneficial when it comes to individual-level cost-benefit calculations. Clearly, however, this tentative explanation would require further substantiation.
Interestingly, neither high-income individuals, nor owners of financial assets stand out as more supportive of Eurobonds' introduction -a finding that mirrors recent evidence on opinions regarding European bailout measures among German respondents (Bechtel et al., 2014) . One explanation might be that Eurobonds (and direct bailout measures more generally) could induce moral hazard problems, and thereby encourage prolonged (or excessive) instability of European financial markets. As this would be particularly harmful for high-income owners of financial assets, it might counteract their inherent supportive attitude towards a closer fiscal union.
Our two country-level self-interest hypotheses (H2 and H3) receive mixed support. 9 Starting with H3, we find that citizens in countries with higher levels of social expenditures (SOCEXPj) are significantly less likely to support Eurobonds. This is in line with H3, and suggests that further European fiscal integration may be linked to fears of a dilution of existing welfare entitlements through a process of 'mean-reversion'. Respondents in countries with a higher level of social expenditures are, however, significantly more likely to support automatic penalties for fiscal irresponsibility, as well as financial help to Member States in financial difficulties. While this is at odds with H3, the former may be driven by the fact that automatic penalties are arguably the least invasive way of imposing fiscal discipline. Indeed, whereas enforced EU-level budget consultations may directly impact the level and composition of public spending, this is not the case for automatic penalties -which could make them more appealing to citizens in countries fearing mean-reversion in welfare entitlements from more direct forms of EU fiscal integration. The latter effect most likely relates to the fact that extensive welfare state provisions at least partly reflect the more altruistic preferences of inhabitants of such countries.
With respect to H2, our results suggest that respondents in countries with higher levels of public debt as well as residents of Euro debtor countries tend to be more supportive of Eurobonds and financial bailouts (in line with H2). Similarly, respondents in Euro debtor countries and countries with higher deficits are less supportive of EU-level consultations of the national budgets. Taken together, the general tenor of these findings could reflect a (natural?) tendency to desire the availability of bailout funds without restrictions on national sovereignty. While not fully reflective of our initial hypothesis H2, these findings do indicate that the current borrowing costs of one's country bear not only on politicians', but also on citizens', opinions towards European fiscal integration.
Our remaining hypotheses are related to the role of individuals' EU-level corruption perceptions and political ideology (H4 and H5). Here, we cannot reject the proposition that citizens' opinions on fiscal integration are shaped by underlying beliefs in the EU's integrity (H4; see also Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000) . The coefficient estimate (EU CORRUPTij) is positive and statistically significant in three of four models. Note that these results arise despite the fact that we control for trust in the EU at the country-level (TRUSTEUj), which shows a consistent positive relation to individual-level opinions towards European fiscal integration (though statistical significance at conventional levels is reached in only two of four estimations). Finally, our results suggest that individuals' political leaning plays an interesting role (H5). Specifically, we find that individuals towards the extremes of the political spectrum are significantly more likely to approve Eurobonds, while respondents on the left are somewhat more likely to approve financial help to other Member States. This is closely in line with the customary economic policy preferences of left-versus right-wing parties (Budge et al., 1987; Quinn and Toyoda, 2007; Bechtel et al., 2014) .
Preference heterogeneity within socio-demographic groups across countries
Thus far, the slopes of the regression lines representing individual-level characteristics have been kept constant across countries. Hypothesis H6, however, suggests that this might be inappropriate where it concerns young and unemployed individuals, as well as single parents.
In Table 2 , we therefore treat the variables AGEij and UNEMPij as random terms and extend our estimation model with a cross-level interaction between GIIPSij and the variables AGEij and UNEMPij. The results are reported in the same format as Table 1. 10 Table 2 about here Table 2 illustrates that, while leaving our previous findings unaffected, the interaction term between UNEMPij and GIIPSij never reaches statistical significance. Hence, there appears to be no significant difference between unemployed individuals in Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries when it comes to their opinions towards European fiscal integration. In contrast, the interaction between GIIPSij and AGEij is statistically significant at conventional levels in three of four models. In those models (i.e. Eurobonds, Automatic Penalties and Financial Help), its coefficient estimate is also substantially larger (in absolute terms) than the non-interacted coefficient of AGEij. This suggests the presence of an important intra-generational divide across young citizens of Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries: i.e. young generations in Euro debtor countries are relatively less in favour of European fiscal integration compared to adults, while the reverse holds in Euro creditor countries. Importantly, when comparing Columns (5) and (6) in Table 2 this effect appears substantially and statistically stronger among the subsample with detailed knowledge of Eurobonds, suggesting that this finding is not driven by non-attitude measurement.
We should also point out that young generations in Euro debtor countries are relatively more in favour automatic penalties. While this initially appears peculiar, a potential explanation might again reside in the fact that automatic penalties are the least invasive way of imposing some degree of fiscal discipline. Young generations in Euro debtor countries may prefer this route, because it leaves substantial autonomy with respect to the level and composition of public spending. Overall, however, our findings not only demonstrate that the same demographic groups may have varying positions towards fiscal unification in different countries, but also that younger generations in Euro debtor countries are becoming more sceptical towards the EU project. As citizens of Euro debtor countries have traditionally been pro-EU, this may have important implications for the future of European integration.
Finally, does this variation in younger individuals' opinions across countries (observed in Table   2 ) really work through their diverging evaluation of the cost of EU-level fiscal austerity and coordination (i.e. our main line of argument above)? We assess this by analysing public support for the actions undertaken so far by the EU to deal with the crisis -using Eurobarometer 75. (1) to "Yes, very effectively" (4). This admittedly does not constitute a direct measure of the cost of EU-level fiscal austerity and coordination. Yet, assuming that a higher evaluation of such costs will translate into lower evaluations of EU's handling of the crisis, it provides a valid proxy thereof. Hence, we re-estimate equation (1) with this alternative dependent variable, again using a multilevel ordered logit model to deal with the specific nature of the dependent variable and data-structure. The results are reported in Table 3. 11 Table 3 about here
The significant interaction between GIIPSij and AGEij suggests that young people in Euro debtor countries are significantly less likely to support EU's actions undertaken in the light of the crisis (compared to young people in Euro creditor countries). This provides suggestive evidence in line with the idea that the higher disapproval of direct and invasive measures of fiscal integration by younger citizens in Euro debtor countries (observed in Table 2 ) is driven at least in part by their higher apprehension towards the EU's crisis-policies. Hence, the intragenerational divide across young citizens of Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries observed in Table 2 indeed appears to reflect their diverging expectations regarding the costs and benefits of further European fiscal integration. Note that in this case we also observe a significant Unemployed*GIIPS interaction. Hence, there appears also to be a difference between unemployed individuals in Euro debtor and Euro creditor countries in the evaluation of the EU's handling of the crisis.
CONCLUSION
European fiscal integration has been high on the political agenda in recent years. While often generating fierce debates and lengthy negotiation periods, several agreements -including the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (European Council, 2012) but is also characterised by a deeply divided public opinion within countries (Bechtel et al., 2014; Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014; Tosun et al., 2014 States' national bonds, there will obviously be winners and losers.
2 Such country-level hypotheses have likewise been brought forward in the broader literature analysing public support for European integration. Previous studies, for instance, show that citizens in countries that are net-recipients of EU cohesion policies favour European integration more than those in net-contributor countries (Brinegar et al., 2004) .
3 Figure 1 suggests that older residents are perceived as more strongly affected by a slightly larger share of respondents in Euro creditor than Euro debtor countries. This makes our assumption of no difference probably a conservative standpoint, as any difference would bias our results against the hypothesis derived here. 4 It should be noted that this concern is at least partially mitigated by the fact that a relatively high share of respondents (i.e. 9% to 15%) replied "do not know" to the questions on fiscal integration and Eurobonds (and are thereby excluded from the analyses below). Such nonresponse is substantially lower for more accessible questions in the same survey, which suggests that those who answered our central questions are likely to have effectively had an opinion.
5 One might be concerned about the potential endogeneity of this variable. To assuage such fears, we repeated the analysis without it. This had no substantive effect on our main inferences (details upon request). 6 We experimented with three alternatives -i.e. age as a continuous variable; in three age groups (<30; 30-50 and >50); in five age groups (<30; 30-40; 40-50; 50-60 and >60) . These all indicated a clear discontinuity around the 30-years threshold, but very limited differences afterwards. To maintain the most parsimonious model, we use the simple below/over 30 years indicator variable (details of alternatives available upon request). 
